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Humans use prior knowledge to bias decisions made under uncertainty. In this fMRI study
we predicted that different brain dynamics play a role when prior knowledge is added to
decisions made under perceptual vs. categorical uncertainty. Subjects decided whether
shapes belonged to Category S – smoother – or Category B – bumpier – under both uncer-
tainty conditions, with or without prior knowledge cues.When present, the prior knowledge
cue, 80/20 or 50/50, indicated that 80 and 20% (or 50 and 50%) were the chances that
responding “S” and “B” (or vice versa) would be correct. During perceptual uncertainty,
shapes were degraded with noise. During categorical uncertainty, shapes were ambigu-
ous. Adding the 80/20 cue increased activation during perceptual uncertainty in bilateral
lateral occipital (LO) cortex and left middle frontal gyrus (MidFG), and decreased activity
in bilateral LO cortex during categorical uncertainty. Right MidFG and other frontoparietal
regions were active in all conditions. The results demonstrate that left MidFG shows acti-
vation changes, suggestive of an influence on visual cortex, that depend on the factor that
makes the decisions difficult. When sensory evidence is difficult to perceive, prior knowl-
edge increases visual cortical activity. When the sensory evidence is easy to perceive but
difficult to interpret, prior knowledge decreases visual cortical activity.
Keywords: prior probability, expectation, frontoparietal, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
INTRODUCTION
Studies of perceptual decisions made under uncertainty use var-
ious methods to define and control uncertainty. One common
approach is to ask subjects to make decisions about targets
degraded with noise. We call this type of uncertainty perceptual
uncertainty because difficulty perceiving the sensory evidence in
the noise is the limiting factor on accuracy. Another approach is to
ask subjects to make decisions about targets that are members of
overlapping categories, such that some targets are ambiguous and
could belong to either category. We call this type of uncertainty
categorical uncertainty because the sensory evidence, though easy
to perceive, is difficult to interpret.
Historically, researchers testing sensory and systems neuro-
science hypotheses typically choose to use perceptual uncer-
tainty, while researchers testing neuroeconomic and cognitive
neuroscience hypotheses are more likely to use conditions anal-
ogous to categorical uncertainty. In both uncertainty conditions,
when prior knowledge indicates that one alternative is likelier
than another, subjects bias their decisions in favor of the indi-
cated alternative (Green and Swets, 1966). However, the neural
mechanism(s) underlying this behavioral effect are not well
understood.
In this study, we show that modulatory effects obtained in the
laboratory using perceptual uncertainty may not generalize to con-
ditions of categorical uncertainty, and vice versa. These results may
be valuable to researchers seeking to interpret data and design
translational studies bridging different subfields of neuropsychol-
ogy. For example, in ecological contexts, the ability to apply prior
knowledge during conditions of perceptual uncertainty may be
highly adaptive. If an organism knows that there are tigers in the
region, it makes sense for that organism to “see” a barely percep-
tible shape in the shadows as a likely tiger. In contrast, there are
other contexts – for example, financial – in which categorical, not
perceptual, uncertainty is the bottleneck making decisions diffi-
cult. When a person makes decisions about how to interpret a
number representing a price, the decision process generally does
not depend on the legibility of the digits. More commonly, the
digits are clearly perceived, but may be difficult to categorize as
too high or too low.
In previous fMRI studies (Hansen et al., 2011, 2012), we manip-
ulated prior knowledge during decisions about visual stimuli in
categorical uncertainty only. Instead of asking subjects to make
decisions about abstract items such as numbers, we asked them
to categorize shapes that differed along the single, quantitative
dimension of curvature. These studies showed that prior knowl-
edge altered fMRI activity levels in prefrontal and parietal cortex,
but did not reveal enhanced activity from prior knowledge in visual
cortex. The absence of an effect in visual cortex was surprising,
because it seemed to be at odds with published observations doc-
umenting that cues providing subjects with expectations about
visual stimuli enhanced activity in stimulus-selective visual cortex
(Eger et al., 2007; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008; Esterman and
Yantis, 2010).
We wondered whether this lack of an effect in visual cortex
might be due to the fact that decisions in our studies were made
under categorical uncertainty only. Our reasoning here was that
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given sensory stimuli that were ambiguous but not degraded with
noise, substantial internal modulation of the sensory evidence
would amount to misperception. In contrast, during perceptual
uncertainty, when sensory stimuli are noisy, it could be adaptive
for prior knowledge to enhance the representation of the evidence
itself. Therefore, we hypothesized that prior knowledge would
increase activity in sensory processing regions in decisions made
under perceptual uncertainty but not categorical uncertainty.
To test this hypothesis, we asked subjects to categorize curved
shapes under perceptual uncertainty, with and without prior
knowledge, and compared the resulting behavioral and fMRI data
with the previously published categorical uncertainty data. Dif-
ferences in activation between the perceptual and the categorical
uncertainty conditions were identified in left middle frontal gyrus
(MidFG) and in bilateral lateral occipital (LO) cortex. In all three
regions, activation levels were greater during perceptual than cat-
egorical uncertainty. Breaking down the within-regions of interest
(ROI) data into prior knowledge and naïve subject groups revealed
that the activation differences observed in the pooled data were
driven by the prior knowledge group. In the perceptual uncer-
tainty condition, activations in left MidFG and bilateral LO were
higher for prior knowledge subjects than naïve subjects, while in
the categorical uncertainty condition, activations in left MidFG
and bilateral LO were lower for prior knowledge subjects than
naïve subjects. The sign of the activations was positive in all con-
ditions in the occipital regions. In left MidFG, the activation was
positive during perceptual uncertainty with prior knowledge and
negative in the other conditions. Right MidFG and other regions
previously implicated in executive control and decisions were pos-
itively activated in all conditions, but the activation levels did not
differ across uncertainty type. Thus, positive MidFG activation
was right-biased in three of the four experimental conditions, and
activation was seen in both right and left MidFG only during
perceptual uncertainty with prior knowledge.
These findings indicate that left MidFG shows activation
changes, suggestive of an influence on visual cortex, that depend on
the factor that makes the decisions difficult. Given prior knowledge
when the limiting factor is perceptibility, right prefrontal activity
is accompanied by positive activity in left prefrontal cortex and
enhanced positive activity in sensory processing regions. In con-
trast, when the sensory evidence is easy to perceive but difficult
to interpret, prior knowledge results in right-biased prefrontal




In this study, we report fMRI and behavioral data from 66 sub-
jects (34 male) of mean age 25 years (range 20–41). All subjects
provided informed consent before the experiment. All procedures
were approved by the National Institute of Mental Health Insti-
tutional Review Board. All subjects were right-handed and had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Of the subjects, 22 made
decisions under perceptual uncertainty with prior knowledge; 22
made decisions under categorical uncertainty with prior knowl-
edge; and 22 made decisions under both uncertainty conditions
with no prior knowledge. For the first subject group, we acquired
data from 26 subjects but excluded data from four because d ′ from
the scanning data was more than 2 SDs below the mean of the other
subjects’d ′ (two subjects) or a decision criterion shift was observed
in the non-predicted direction (two subjects). The last two sub-
ject groups were described in a previous publication in which we
used a different approach to analyze the datasets (Hansen et al.,
2011); the perceptual uncertainty data are presented here for the
first time.
STIMULI AND TASK
Subjects used two fingers of the right hand to press buttons to
report decisions about visual targets. In the categorical uncertainty
condition, targets were form-modulated. The form-modulated
targets were distorted circles with sinusoidal modulation rang-
ing linearly from 4 to 22% of the mean radius, with a step size
of 0.5% (Figure 1). No noise obscured the form-modulated tar-
gets. Distributions of Category S and B form-modulated targets
were Gaussian and overlapping (Healy and Kubovy,1981; Maddox,
2002). The overlapping distributions (Figure 1) made the interme-
diate form-modulated targets ambiguous, so that the targets alone
would not contain sufficient information for subjects to classify
them with perfect accuracy. In the perceptual uncertainty condi-
tion, targets were signal-to-noise-modulated (SNR-modulated).
The SNR-modulated targets were distorted circles (Wilkinson
et al., 1998) with sinusoidal modulation of either 4% (Category S
for smooth) or 22% (Category B for bumpy) of the mean radius,
obscured with noise (Figure 1). The noise pattern used in each
image was unique. We created the noise patterns by combining
an original target’s power spectrum with random phases and con-
verting this information back to image space via inverse Fourier
transform. Each target was overlaid with its own noise pattern,
using one of nine different weight ratios that ranged from 15%
target+ 85% noise to 40% target+ 60% noise. The weights were
derived from pilot studies done outside the scanner in order to
equate behavioral performance (as measured by d ′ and by the
magnitude of the criterion shift between the 80/20 and 50/50 prior
knowledge conditions) during perceptual uncertainty relative to
categorical uncertainty. In all, cases, targets were presented one at
a time with random sizes, orientations, and locations to prevent
subjects from relying on retinotopic location or spatial attention
in order to perform well.
Before entering the scanner, all subjects underwent behavioral
training that provided instant feedback after each trial. For the
subjects making decisions with prior knowledge, the explicit prior
knowledge cue “80/20” in some runs and “50/50” in other runs
preceded each SNR-modulated or form-modulated shape. The
indicated target category – that is, the category indicated by 80
in the 80/20 runs – was either S or B for each subject. The 80/20
training runs were comprised of 80% indicated and 20% con-
traindicated targets, and the 50/50 training runs were comprised
of 50% indicated and 50% contraindicated targets. Thus, during
training, the explicit prior knowledge cues reflected the implicit
prior probability distributions of the targets. The training dis-
tributions were created by manipulating the prior probability of
occurrence of the physical targets themselves, rather than chang-
ing the category boundary. The prior knowledge subjects were
informed explicitly that the target distributions were either 80%
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FIGURE 1 |Targets and trial structure. The SNR-modulated targets that
created perceptual uncertainty are shown on the left, and the
form-modulated targets that created categorical uncertainty are shown
on the right. (A) Example targets. The SNR-modulated targets were
either extremely smooth or extremely bumpy and were overlaid with
varying amounts of noise; each individual noise pattern was unique. The
form-modulated targets were of varying degrees of curvature and were
not overlaid with noise. (B) Target distributions used in all scanning runs
for all subjects. (C) Trial structure in scanning runs. The subjects’ task was
to decide whether each target belonged to Category S or B. Depending
on subject group and run, the cue was 80/20, 50/50, or OO/OO. The set
of images used to provide the 200-ms stimuli for the trials were identical
across the 80/20, 50/50, and OO/OO scanning runs; only the cue
changed.
indicated and 20% contraindicated or 50% of each, and their
understanding of this concept and the task was confirmed by their
answers to questions during pre-training instruction.
For the naïve subjects, a sham cue “OO/OO” preceded each
SNR-modulated or form-modulated shape. The subjects were told
that they could think of the letter O’s as open eyes reminding them
to keep looking at the screen. Except for the cue, the training runs
for the naïve subjects were identical in all respects, including the
target images, to the 50/50 training runs for the prior knowledge
subjects. Thus, the training runs for the naïve subjects were com-
prised of 50% S and 50% B targets, although the subjects were
not informed explicitly of this fact. In fact, except for the cue, all
aspects of the training runs for the naïve subjects, including the
target image sets, were identical to the training runs used for the
prior knowledge subjects at 50/50. The subjects’ understanding
of the task was confirmed by their answers to questions during
pre-training instruction.
During scanning, no subject received feedback. In one-third
of the scanning trials, a blank screen took the place of the tar-
get and subjects were instructed to make no response; including
these blank trials permitted us to obtain estimates of activity dur-
ing decision vs. blank trials. The only difference in the runs for
the prior knowledge subjects vs. the naïve subjects was that the
cues – as in the training runs – were 80/20 or 50/50 for the prior
knowledge subjects and OO/OO for the naïve subjects. Impor-
tantly, for all subjects, all scanning runs were comprised of 50% S
and 50% B targets, and the target images themselves were identical
in every respect for all subjects. This control ensured that differ-
ences between prior knowledge conditions could be attributed
only to the cue and not to stimulation differences.
The order of trial types (Category S target, Category B tar-
get, or blank) for the scanning runs was determined by assigning
each run a different ternary m-sequence. m-Sequences are effi-
cient in terms of signal per time, especially for relatively short scan
durations, and are exactly counterbalanced over time, minimizing
any uncontrolled adaptation or expectation effects (Sutter, 2001;
Buracˇas and Boynton, 2002). m-Sequences were generated using
code written by Buracˇas and Boynton (2002). Each run-length m-
sequence was length 34− 1= 80 trials, consisting of 27 Category
S stimulus trials, 27 Category B stimulus trials, and 26 blank trials.
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Each trial lasted 2.5 s. A blank grayscale screen was shown for 10 s at
the beginning of each run to allow the magnetic field to reach equi-
librium and for 12.5 s at the end of each run to allow for the delay
in the hemodynamic response. The data presented here represent
six runs at 80/20 and six runs at 50/50 from each prior knowledge
subject, under either perceptual or categorical uncertainty, and six
runs under perceptual and six runs under categorical uncertainty
from each naïve subject.
IMAGING DATA ACQUISITION AND PREPROCESSING
All MRI data were collected on a GE 3-T scanner with a GE
whole-head eight-channel coil. For fMRI we used an EPI (echo-
planar imaging) sequence with TR (repetition time)= 2.5 s per
shot (=2.5 s per acquired brain volume), TE (echo time)= 30 ms,
field of view 22 cm× 22 cm, resolution 64× 64 voxels per slice (in-
plane voxel size 3.4 mm× 3.4 mm), and slice thickness 3.0 mm.
Each fMRI brain volume consisted of 38 axial slices. For anatom-
ical images we used an MP-RAGE (magnetization prepared
rapid acquisition gradient echo) sequence with field of view
24 cm× 24 cm, 128 locations per slab, and slice thickness 1.2 mm.
Unless otherwise noted, preprocessing and subsequent analysis of
the MRI data was performed with the AFNI software package (Cox,
1996; Cox and Hyde, 1997). The first four brain volumes of every
fMRI run were removed; brain volumes were shifted to account
for slice acquisition time and motion-corrected. Each subject’s T1-
weighted anatomical dataset was warped via 12-parameter affine
transform to the TT-N27 brain template.
ROI IDENTIFICATION
To identify ROIs as a test of our main hypothesis – that prior
knowledge would increase activity in sensory processing regions
in decisions made under perceptual uncertainty but not categori-
cal uncertainty – we used a general linear model (GLM) in which
the regressor of interest was a sequence of 0’s and 1’s convolved
with a model hemodynamic function. The 0’s and 1’s represented
blank and decision trials respectively. The outputs of each GLM
were voxelwise beta weights representing decision trial activity for
a single subject in one condition, where the six possible condi-
tions were perceptual uncertainty with prior knowledge at 80/20,
perceptual uncertainty with prior knowledge at 50/50, percep-
tual uncertainty without prior knowledge, categorical uncertainty
with prior knowledge at 80/20, categorical uncertainty with prior
knowledge at 50/50, and categorical uncertainty without prior
knowledge. Using a two-tailed t -test on data from the 80/20
and naïve conditions, pooled across all subjects, we calculated
the group voxelwise significance of the absolute value of the
difference between the beta weights from the perceptual uncer-
tainty vs. categorical uncertainty conditions. ROIs were located
by limiting surviving clusters in the group results to regions with
p-values< 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons across voxels.
Cluster coordinates were determined by affine registration to the
TT-N27 brain template.
In a subsequent test we located regions with positive decision-
related fMRI activity in the conjunction of four conditions: 80/20
perceptual uncertainty, naïve perceptual uncertainty, 80/20 cat-
egorical uncertainty, and naïve categorical uncertainty. Using a
two-tailed t -test pooled across all subjects, we calculated the
group voxelwise significance of the mean activation level for each
condition. ROIs were located by limiting surviving clusters to
regions with p-values< 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons
across voxels and experimental conditions. The conjunction here
was the strict conjunction of conditions. As in Nichols et al. (2005),
we used a test for a logical AND by requiring that all the compar-
isons in the conjunction were individually significant: to obtain the
corrected p< 0.05 across conditions, we required positive activa-
tions of p< 0.0125 in every one of the four conditions. Cluster
coordinates were determined by affine registration to the TT-N27
brain template.
We also located regions where activity, as defined by linear
covariation with the degree of uncertainty, differed across uncer-
tainty conditions. The object here was to test for the possibility that
although no regions exhibited greater average activity during cate-
gorical than perceptual uncertainty, some regions’activity covaried
with categorical but not perceptual uncertainty and vice versa. We
performed ROI searches using this approach on the naïve and
80/20 data independently. In each prior condition, we performed
a whole-brain search and a search constrained to perirhinal cor-
tex and anterior temporal lobe, which are known to be responsive
for learned visual categories. With the exception of the regressors
used in the GLM analyses of individual subject data, these analy-
ses were essentially equivalent to that defining the ROIs for our
main hypothesis (above). In the covariation analysis, the regressor
of interest was a sequence of numbers ranging between 0 and 1,
convolved with a model hemodynamic function. Before convolu-
tion, target trials were represented by a number between 0 and
1 equivalent to the distance from the target distribution’s nearest
extreme to its midpoint. Thus, midpoint targets received a value of
1 (representing complete uncertainty), endpoint targets received
a value of 0 (representing no uncertainty), and intermediate tar-




The behavioral data acquired during fMRI data acquisition
(Figure 2) indicated that training with the prior knowledge cues
induced a decision bias during the fMRI experiment. In this paper,
the term prior knowledge subjects refers to subjects trained in con-
ditions that both implicitly and explicitly indicated that one of
two target categories was likelier to be presented than the other. We
refer to prior knowledge subjects trained that Category S (or B) was
the likely category as Group S (or B) prior knowledge subjects. The
term naïve subjects refers to subjects trained in conditions that did
not implicitly or explicitly indicate either category as more likely
than the other. For details about the training, see Section “Mate-
rials and Methods” and Figure 1. During the fMRI experiment,
Group S prior knowledge subjects working under both percep-
tual and categorical uncertainty responded “S” (or “B”) for a given
shape more often than did the naïve subjects making decisions
about the same shapes (Figure 2). That is – unsurprisingly – prior
knowledge about the stimuli biased subjects’ decisions in favor of
the expected stimulus type. Under both uncertainty conditions,
given the 50/50 prior knowledge cue, the prior knowledge subjects
retained a persistent, though diminished, bias of the same sign
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FIGURE 2 | Decision behavior during fMRI scanning. The plots show
that priors training biased decision reports, relative to naïve subjects, in
both perceptual uncertainty (top) and categorical uncertainty (bottom).
Black: naïve subjects. Red: prior knowledge subjects whose pre-scan
training indicated that the likelier category to appear was Category B
(bumpier); behavior given the 80/20 cue. Relative to the other subjects,
the decision reports of these subjects are biased in favor of a “B”
response. Dark blue: behavior of the same subjects given the 50/50 cue.
Orange: prior knowledge subjects whose pre-scan training indicated that
the likelier category to appear was Category S (smoother); behavior
given the 80/20 cue. Relative to the other subjects, the decision reports
of these subjects are biased in favor of an “S” response. Light blue:
behavior of the same subjects given the 50/50 cue. Error bars represent
±1 SE across subjects. In the categorical uncertainty plots (bottom), the
error bars tend to be very small at intermediate and larger at extreme
stimulus levels. This pattern reflects the fact that the form-modulated
target distribution included many intermediate, i.e., ambiguous, targets,
and relatively few extreme, i.e., unambiguous, targets.
as their bias in the 80/20 condition; for an in-depth examination
of this phenomenon in the categorical uncertainty condition, see
Hansen et al. (2011).
To obtain a first indication of the mechanisms underlying the
decision bias induced by prior knowledge, we examined response
times (RTs) in all subjects (Figure 3). In the prior knowledge
subjects, RTs were shorter at 80/20 than 50/50 in both uncertainty
conditions, demonstrating that prior knowledge about the stim-
uli conferred a speed advantage regardless of uncertainty type. In
the prior knowledge subjects, RTs were also shorter for subjects
performing under perceptual than categorical uncertainty. This
observation suggests that the mechanism by which prior knowl-
edge is integrated into decisions differs when the decisions are
made under perceptual vs. categorical uncertainty. Importantly,
RTs in the naïve subjects did not differ during perceptual vs. cate-
gorical uncertainty, implying that our effort to match difficulty
across uncertainty types by adjusting the noise weights in the
perceptual uncertainty condition was successful.
IMAGING DATA
The current study was designed to reveal differences in how
the brain integrates prior knowledge into decisions during per-
ceptual vs. categorical uncertainty. To investigate this topic, we
first identified ROIs in which activation levels were different in
decision trials made under perceptual vs. categorical uncertainty,
pooled across all subjects (Materials and Methods). The ROI
locations – left MidFG, left LO and posterior fusiform (LOpF)
cortex, and right LO are shown in Figure 4, and their coor-
dinates and volumes are listed in Table 1. These results show
that left MidFG, left LO/pF, and right LO responded differen-
tially to the perceptual uncertainty and the categorical uncertainty
conditions.
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The analysis that located the ROIs pooled the data across all sub-
jects. To indicate whether the differences were driven by the prior
knowledge subjects, the naïve subjects, or both groups, we plotted
activations for each condition separately in a within-ROI bar chart
(Figure 5). The chart shows that the differences were driven by the
prior knowledge data. In all three ROIs, the perceptual uncer-
tainty condition evoked the same activity level as the categorical
uncertainty condition in the naïve subjects. At 80/20, the prior
FIGURE 3 | Response times. The 80/20 cue gave a speed advantage to the
prior knowledge subjects relative to the 50/50 cue in the same subjects.
Across the prior knowledge subjects, response times were longer for the
subjects performing under categorical than perceptual uncertainty. This
difference was not seen in the naïve subjects. Stars indicate p<0.0001,
calculated via a two-tailed t -test across conditions.
knowledge subjects showed greater activation than the naïve sub-
jects in visual association (LO/pF) and prefrontal (MidFG) cor-
tices during perceptual uncertainty. In contrast, during categorical
uncertainty, at 80/20 the prior knowledge subjects showed less acti-
vation than the naïve subjects in bilateral LO (in the MidFG ROI,
a trend in the same direction did not reach significance). Thus, the
results supported our main hypothesis: prior knowledge increased
activity in sensory processing regions in decisions made under per-
ceptual uncertainty but not categorical uncertainty. The results
also indicated a prefrontal mechanism for this effect, namely, pos-
itive activity levels in left MidFG, which occurred only during
decisions made in the combination of perceptual uncertainty and
prior knowledge.
The procedure for locating ROIs was based on a contrast: the
absolute value of the difference between activity levels during
Table 1 | Brain regions selective for uncertainty condition.
Location x y z Volume (mm3)
Middle frontal
gyrus (MidFG)





−29.4 −74.7 −1.8 9822
Lateral occipital
cortex (LO)
34.4 −77.2 6.6 4406
This table provides the coordinates and volumes of voxel clusters respondingwith
activation differences (p<0.05, corrected) between decision trials under percep-
tual vs. categorical uncertainty, pooled across subjects. Negative (positive) values
of x indicate the left (right) hemisphere.
FIGURE 4 | Brain regions selective for uncertainty condition. We pooled
the 80/20 and naive fMRI datasets across all subjects and searched for
regions with a significant (p<0.05, corrected) difference, of either sign,
between the perceptual and categorical uncertainty conditions. Surviving
clusters are shown here, overlaid on an average of the anatomical images
from all subjects.
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FIGURE 5 | Within-ROI results. The bar charts show mean brain activity
across all decision trials, relative to blanks, in each condition. Stars indicate
differences of p<0.05 as calculated with a two-tailed t -test. In the naïve
subjects, decisions under perceptual uncertainty evoked the same level of
within-ROI activity as decisions under categorical uncertainty. Adding the
prior knowledge cue to decisions under perceptual uncertainty visual
targets increased activation in visual association and prefrontal cortices
relative to no prior knowledge cue. Adding the prior knowledge cue to
decisions under categorical uncertainty decreased activation in visual
association cortex relative to no prior knowledge cue. In left MidFG, only
decisions made under perceptual uncertainty with the 80/20 prior
knowledge cue resulted in positive brain activations; the mean activation
with the 50/50 cue was not significantly above zero.
perceptual vs. categorical uncertainty. We also wished to docu-
ment the regions in which decisions in each of four conditions –
perceptual uncertainty with 80/20 prior knowledge, perceptual
uncertainty without prior knowledge, categorical uncertainty with
80/20 prior knowledge, and categorical uncertainty without prior
knowledge – elicited positive levels of activation. Table 2 lists the
coordinates and volumes of brain regions active in the strict con-
junction (defined by logical AND) of the four conditions (p< 0.05,
corrected for multiple comparisons between voxels and experi-
mental conditions): right MidFG; left putamen (Put); two clusters
in the left anterior insula (AntIns1 and AntIns2); a left hemi-
sphere thalamic cluster (Thal) whose coordinates included those
of the medial dorsal, ventral posterior medial, ventral posterior lat-
eral, and ventral lateral nuclei; a left hemisphere cluster including
postcentral gyrus, inferior parietal lobule (IPL), and intrapari-
etal sulcus (PcG/IPL/IPS); right IPL; and large bilateral clusters
covering much of ventrotemporal cortex plus some cerebellum
(VT/cereb).
One particularly interesting observation emerging from this
table is of a right hemisphere MidFG (a.k.a. dorsolateral pre-
frontal, DLPFC) cluster, active in all four conditions. The right
MidFG cluster also overlaps with a region in which activity modu-
lations across prior knowledge conditions were previously shown
to correlate with the main effect of prior knowledge on decision
behavior, i.e., a shift in the decision criterion (Hansen et al., 2012).
The right MidFG cluster observed in the current study is also
Table 2 | Brain regions active in all conditions.
Location x y z Volume
(mm3)
Middle frontal gyrus (MidFG) 44.5 33.2 22.5 533
Anterior insula, focus 1 −28.6 14.9 10.7 533
Putamen (Put) −21.7 1.2 5.9 2769
Medial frontal gyrus (MedFG) −2.8 0.2 49.2 4651
Anterior insula, focus 2 −38.2 −5.4 14.9 604
Thalamus (Thal): medial dorsal,
ventral posterior medial, ventral
posterior lateral, and ventral
lateral nuclei
−12.6 −17.3 8.1 2521
Postcentral gyrus, inferior
parietal lobule, and intraparietal
sulcus (PcG/IPL/IPS)
−40.5 −29.8 48.7 15372
Inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 45.6 −36.4 38.5 391
Ventrotemporal cortex and
cerebellum (VT/cereb)
27.7 −58.0 −16.1 20874
Ventrotemporal cortex and
cerebellum (VT/cereb)
−33.7 −66.5 −14.1 9443
This table provides the coordinates and volumes of voxel clusters responding
with positive activations during decision trials in all four conditions (p<0.05, cor-
rected), where the conditions were perceptual uncertainty with prior knowledge,
perceptual uncertainty without prior knowledge, categorical uncertainty with
prior knowledge, and categorical uncertainty without prior knowledge. Negative
(positive) values of x indicate the left (right) hemisphere.
located at coordinates that are essentially the mirror image of
the left hemisphere MidFG coordinates. Recall that the left hemi-
sphere MidFG ROI was activated by decisions during both prior
knowledge and perceptual uncertainty, but deactivated in all other
conditions. Thus, across all conditions the overall pattern of activ-
ity in DLPFC was generally right-biased, becoming bilateral only
when prior knowledge was combined with perceptual uncertainty.
We also located regions where activity, as defined by linear
covariation with the degree of uncertainty, differed across uncer-
tainty conditions. The object here was to test for the possibility that
although no regions exhibited greater average activity during cate-
gorical than perceptual uncertainty, some regions’activity covaried
with categorical but not perceptual uncertainty and vice versa. We
performed ROI searches using this approach on the naïve and
80/20 data independently. In each prior condition, we performed
a whole-brain search and a search constrained to perirhinal cortex
and anterior temporal lobe, which are known to be responsive for
learned visual categories.
Whole-brain searches in naïve subjects revealed ROIs in left
and right LO (Table 3). These overlapped with the LO ROIs iden-
tified in the main test. Activity levels in both ROIs covaried with
the degree of uncertainty more during perceptual than categorical
uncertainty. In prior knowledge subjects at 80/20, smaller over-
lapping ROIs showed the same difference sign (perceptual over
categorical). An additional ROI was identified in lingual gyrus in
the 80/20 data only, and in this ROI activity levels covaried more
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Table 3 | Brain regions selective for uncertainty condition when
activity was defined as covariation with degree of uncertainty.





Lateral occipital cortex (LO)
−26.6 −73.4 −4.6 9042 Perceptual
30.1 −69.3 2.8 11170 Perceptual
80/20
Lateral occipital cortex (LO)
−27.1 −78.7 5.3 4680 Perceptual
34.4 −76.3 9.2 2837 Perceptual
Lingual gyrus −1.8 −74.5 1.7 3652 Categorical
This table provides the coordinates and volumes of voxel clusters respondingwith
covariation differences (p< 0.05, corrected) between perceptual vs. categorical
uncertainty. Negative (positive) values of x indicate the left (right) hemisphere.
Table 4 | Brain regions selective for uncertainty condition when
activity was defined as covariation with degree of uncertainty and the
search space was constrained to anterior temporal lobe and perirhinal
cortex.







22.9 −29.3 −15.5 106 Categorical
80/20
(No ROIs located at 80/20)
This table provides the coordinates and volumes of voxel clusters respondingwith
covariation differences (p< 0.05, corrected) between perceptual vs. categorical
uncertainty. Negative (positive) values of x indicate the left (right) hemisphere.
during categorical than perceptual uncertainty. However, some
care should be exercised in interpreting this result, since the loca-
tion of the ROI appears to be consistent with a part of early visual
cortex (V1 or V2) representing far-peripheral visual space that
would not have been stimulated by our targets. While we find it dif-
ficult to provide a simple explanation, we note that similar regions
often appear in lists of activated regions in cognitive neuroscience
papers (though the correspondence to far-peripheral V1/V2 is
rarely mentioned). Possibly, some spatial attentional effect may
be involved.
A similar search, constrained to perirhinal cortex and anterior
temporal lobe, identified one ROI (Table 4) in which activity lev-
els covaried more during categorical than perceptual uncertainty
in naïve subjects. No ROIs in this anatomical search space were
identified with greater covariation for perceptual than categori-
cal uncertainty in naïve subjects, and no ROIs in this anatomical
search space were identified at all in the 80/20 data.
One potential concern with the above observations is that the
contrast used to define the key ROIs was based on a subject pool
of which two-thirds were prior knowledge subjects. The potential
pitfall here is a scenario in which the naïve subjects might have
had ROIs in other locations, in which existing differences between
the two uncertainty conditions failed to reach significance in the
pooled subject dataset. To check against this possibility, we per-
formed a separate analysis in an attempt to locate ROIs for the
perceptual vs. categorical uncertainty conditions in the 22 naïve
subjects only. No clusters were found that survived our statistical
threshold.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we asked subjects undergoing fMRI scanning to
make decisions about visual targets under conditions of perceptual
and categorical uncertainty, with and without prior knowledge
of the response that was likely to be correct. Subjects trained
to use a prior knowledge cue showed larger positive activations
in bilateral LO and left pF cortex during decisions made under
perceptual uncertainty than did naïve subjects. Under categori-
cal uncertainty, the prior knowledge subjects experienced smaller
decision-related positive activations than did naïve subjects. In
the left MidFG, the condition associated with the highest acti-
vation levels in the occipital ROIs – namely, prior knowledge
during perceptual uncertainty – was the only one eliciting positive
decision-related activity. During perceptual uncertainty when no
prior knowledge was available and during categorical uncertainty,
regardless of prior knowledge, decisions negatively activated left
MidFG.
These observations enhance our understanding of the integra-
tion of prior knowledge into decision-making in several respects.
First, the results demonstrate that top-down prior knowledge
effects in the brain during perceptual decisions depend on the
reason the decisions are difficult. Namely, the sign of the priors-
related modulation in visual cortex was positive when the sensory
evidence was difficult to perceive and negative when the evidence
was easy to perceive but difficult to interpret. The sign difference
observed across these two conditions implies that the effects of
prior knowledge on perceptual decisions are not uniform across
decision types, but rather depend on the attributes of the stimuli
about which the decisions are made.
Besides simply establishing a dependence on stimulus attrib-
utes, the observations point to underlying neural mechanisms in
each uncertainty condition. During perceptual uncertainty, deci-
sions in the context of prior knowledge positively activated left
MidFG (Figure 4; Table 1). The prefrontal decision-related activa-
tion in the prior knowledge and perceptual uncertainty condition
was actually bilateral, since this condition as well as the others
positively activated right MidFG (Table 2). Our observations may
be related to the observation by Rahnev et al. (2011) of larger
activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex, not far away from the
current site of activity, when participants had prior knowledge
about a perceptual decision. The bilateral MidFG activation was
also associated with increased positive activation in bilateral LO
and left pF cortex, visual regions selective for shapes and objects
(Malach et al., 1995; Grill-Spector et al., 1998; Kourtzi and Kan-
wisher, 2000). This increase in activation confirmed the prediction
that motivated the current study: when stimuli were noisy, such
that enhancing the representation of the sensory evidence could be
adaptive,prior knowledge increased activation in the relevant parts
of visual cortex. The anatomical locations of the occipital ROIs are
consistent with previously documented loci for shape selectivity
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(Malach et al., 1995; Grill-Spector et al., 1998; Kourtzi and Kan-
wisher, 2000), so these were precisely the regions in which signal
modulation had the most potential to affect performance in our
shape decision task. Thus, the perceptual uncertainty observations
are analogous to a previous demonstration that prior knowledge
favoring faces (or houses) enhanced fMRI activity in FFA (or PPA;
Esterman and Yantis, 2010). In parallel, during categorical uncer-
tainty, subjects with prior knowledge experienced significantly
lower activation levels in the visual ROIs than did naïve subjects.
The prediction motivating this study was that prior knowledge
would increase visual cortical activity during perceptual but not
categorical uncertainty; we did not explicitly predict that prior
knowledge would actually decrease visual cortical activity during
categorical uncertainty. However, the decrease is intuitive; it sug-
gests that the prior knowledge subjects were giving less weight to
the sensory evidence of curvature than were the naïve subjects.
Such a strategy would be reasonable, as the RT data imply that
adding prior knowledge to the categorical task imposed an addi-
tional cognitive load relative to the naïve condition. Giving less
weight to visual appearance, relative to the naïve condition, may
have partly compensated for an increased cognitive load.
Our observations may be relevant to those from previous stud-
ies that identified dissociations between abstract rule- or category-
selective activity in prefrontal cortex and stimulus-selective activ-
ity in more posterior brain regions. For example, Jiang et al. (2007)
asked subjects undergoing fMRI to make decisions about morphed
cars and showed that changing perceptual vs. categorical qualities
of the stimuli modulated activity in LO and right prefrontal cor-
tex respectively. Similarly, Montojo and Courtney (2008) used a
mental arithmetic task with fMRI and showed that rule updating
preferentially activates prefrontal cortex while number updating
preferentially activates parietal cortex.
During perceptual uncertainty without prior knowledge, and
during categorical uncertainty regardless of prior knowledge, deci-
sions negatively activated left MidFG (Figure 4; Table 1). The term
negative activation, also known as deactivation, means that the
fMRI signal level was lower during trials when a target was present
and a decision was made than during blank trials when no target
was present and no decision was made. Negative activations are
seen in brain regions whose function is not relevant to the exper-
imental condition being tested. For example, when task-relevant
stimuli are visual, stimulus presentation often results in negative
activation of auditory cortex (Haxby et al., 1994; Amedi et al.,
2005). Concurrent negative and positive activations can also occur
in left hemisphere and right hemisphere counterparts of the same
cortical area. For example, stimulation of the right median nerve,
which elicits positive activation in left primary somatosensory cor-
tex, also elicits negative activation in right primary somatosensory
cortex (Hlushchuk and Hari, 2006; Kastrup et al., 2008). One inter-
pretation of such observations is that negative activations reflect
suppression of functional activity that is not required for the task
at hand. According to this line of reasoning, our results imply
that left MidFG plays a role in integrating prior knowledge dur-
ing perceptual uncertainty, but is not required during decisions
in general. This conclusion is consistent with our previous results
that implicated only right MidFG involvement in prior knowledge
during categorical uncertainty (Hansen et al., 2011, 2012).
Our results also show that the modulation of sensory activity
cannot be attributed to a general arousal effect, but rather is tar-
geted to the part of visual cortex where a modulation could have
the most impact on task performance. This can be seen by exam-
ining the location of the occipital ROIs: bilateral LO and left pF,
regions already known to be selective for shapes and objects like
our shape targets (Malach et al., 1995; Grill-Spector et al., 1998;
Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2000). For comparison, we did not see any
effects in earlier visual areas, such as V1,V2, or V3, which are selec-
tive for the spatial location but not for the shape of visual stimuli.
Since our stimuli were jittered in size, orientation, and spatial posi-
tion, modulatory effects in the earlier visual areas would not be
predicted to affect performance. Changes in arousal or attention
have been shown to modulate signals in these earlier visual areas
(Tootell et al., 1998; Watanabe et al., 1998; Somers et al., 1999;
Huk and Heeger, 2000). Since no such modulation was observed
in the earlier areas, we conclude that the modulation that we did
observe in LO and pF was not due to overall arousal or attentional
state.
During both uncertainty conditions, the decision response
curves (Figure 2) and the within-ROI fMRI activity levels
(Figure 5) seen in prior knowledge subjects at 50/50 tended to
fall between activity levels seen in the same subjects at 80/20 and
activity levels in the naïve subjects. A previous publication (Hansen
et al., 2011) focuses on this interesting persistent bias pattern in
the categorical uncertainty behavioral and fMRI data, showing
for the first time that practice making decisions under categorical
uncertainty in the context of non-equal prior probabilities biases
decisions made later when prior probabilities are equal. In simple
terms, once you learn a bias it is hard to let it go. The observation
of the same tendencies in the perceptual uncertainty data indicates
that bias persistency is not unique to categorical uncertainty, but
may generalize across decision-making paradigms.
Our manipulation of categorical uncertainty involved ambigu-
ous shapes. It might be asked whether we performed a true test
of categorical uncertainty, which would require keeping the shape
information constant, but varying the validity of the association
between the shape and the correct response. In fact, this descrip-
tion fits our manipulation well. The simplest way to see this is to
consider a single categorical shape with curvature in the intermedi-
ate (ambiguous) range – for example, the shape with average (13%)
curvature. A subject’s experience with this shape is equivalent to
the true test of categorical uncertainty. At 50/50 this particular
shape is associated with complete uncertainty, while at 80/20 there
is less uncertainty for this shape. A similar relationship between
the prior condition and the uncertainty level holds for every shape
in the intermediate range. Shapes on the extreme ends of the dis-
tribution are not ambiguous and therefore are associated with no
uncertainty, but this attribute is common to both the categorical
and the perceptual uncertainty conditions.
The increased visual cortical activity seen with prior knowledge
during perceptual (but not categorical) uncertainty is reminiscent
of the increased visual cortical activity seen with top-down, goal-
directed, endogenous attention. Conceivably, similar to the effects
of directing attention to noisy stimuli (Lu and Dosher, 1998), an
adaptive modulation could enhance stimulus attributes indicated
by the prior knowledge and/or decrease contraindicated stimulus
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attributes. Future experiments could explore this issue by system-
atically investigating the effects of attention on classifying targets
during perceptual vs. categorical uncertainty.
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